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TESTIMONY OF JOSHUA D. SARNOFF 
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, IP SUBCOMMITTEE 




Joshua D. Sarnoff is a Professor of Law at DePaul University, 
received the 2018 DePaul Spirit of Inquiry Award, and has received 
numerous awards for his scholarship. He is an internationally 
recognized expert on the intersections of intellectual property law, 
environmental law, health law, and constitutional, administrative, 
and international law. From January 2014 to July 2015, he served as 
the Thomas A. Edison Distinguished Scholar at the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office. In June 2019, he testified before the Intellectual 
Property Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee on 
pending legislation to revise subject matter eligibility doctrine under 




This written testimony of Joshua D. Sarnoff, Professor of 
Law, DePaul University was submitted to the Intellectual Property 
Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee for its hearing on 
June 4, 2019, and addresses the Legislative Draft of May 22, 2019 
to revise patent eligible subject matter. The testimony makes nine 
basic points: 
 
(1) the current uncertainty in eligibility doctrine does not 
justify the pending legislative efforts to eliminate existing 
protection for the public domain of scientific, natural, and 
fundamental discoveries ("science, nature, and ideas");  
 
(2) the pending legislative revision proposals do not address 
the root causes of the doctrinal uncertainty;  
 
(3) the pending proposals, by restricting the public domain 
and displacing line-drawing creativity judgments, would not 
harmonize U.S. patent law with that of other countries;  
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(4) the current, judicially interpreted requirement of Section 
101 to treat ineligible novel discoveries of science, nature, and ideas 
as prior art against applicants claiming practical applications thereof 
is good innovation and moral policy;  
 
(5) by minimizing reliance on eligibility doctrine to 
determine patent validity, the pending proposals would increase 
uncertainty in and costs of the patent system;  
 
(6) the pending proposals would expand the utility patent 
system to aesthetic and other forms of non-technological creativity, 
by removing consideration of the kind of novel creativity from 
eligibility determinations;  
 
(7) expanding the patent system to eliminate the exclusions 
for science, nature, and ideas and to authorize as eligible claims to 
most or all practical, technological applications of nontechnological 
creativity likely will be held unconstitutional, generating further 
legal uncertainty;  
 
(8) trying to avoid those results by more clearly defining 
"specific," "practical" and "technological" utility will prove at least 
as difficult as addressing directly the requisite kind of eligible 
creativity through Section 101's eligible novelty doctrine; and  
 
(9) if Congress proceeds to revise eligibility doctrine, it 
should adopt specific measures to minimize uncertainty, litigation, 
and the need for further legislative revisions.1 
 
Section 101 of the Patent Act provides the "eligibility" 
criteria for the types of things generated by the kinds of creativity 
that can be patented as a utility patent "invention," as well as 
 
1 Sarnoff, Joshua D., Testimony of Joshua D. Sarnoff Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary, Subcommittee on Intellectual Property Hearing: The State of Patent 
Eligibility in America: Part I (June 4, 2019). Abstract. Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3572387  
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requiring that such creative things be "useful."1 Other sections of 
the Patent Act, impose "patentability" restrictions on the grant of 
utility patent rights, as the "quid pro quo" for granting exclusive 
rights to such nonobvious inventions.2 
 
At the most basic level, the purpose of Section 101's subject 
matter eligibility doctrine is therefore to distinguish the kinds of 
mental creativity (invention) that (subject to patentability 
requirements) warrant granting utility patent rights in products or 
processes from the kinds that do not.3 It is important to acknowledge 
that there is a serious problem of the degree of uncertainty regarding 
the perceived purposes and the interpretation and application of 
current eligibility doctrine, beyond the normal legal uncertainty of 
applying general legislation to specific cases.4 Although the 
language of the eligibility provision has remained essentially 
unchanged since the 1793 Patent Act, the doctrine has been 
inconsistently interpreted and applied by the courts over the entire 
time frame, and particularly since the 1970s.5 
 
But Congress cannot provide the needed clarity and 
consistency by legislative language revisions to Section 101 alone. 
Nor can it do so merely by displacing to other patent law doctrines 
the difficult but required judgments of the kinds of creativity that do 
or do not warrant utility patent rights.6 Adequately addressing the 
root causes of the failures of judicial and administrative 
interpretative and adjudicative decisional processes would require 
changes that go well beyond the scope of any contemplated 
legislative revisions. Enacting some such measures into law may 
pose serious separation-of-powers concerns, rendering them 
constitutionally suspect.7 
 
2 Sarnoff, Joshua D., Testimony of Joshua D. Sarnoff Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary, Subcommittee on Intellectual Property Hearing: The State of Patent 
Eligibility in America: Part I (June 4, 2019). Page 3. Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3572387  
3 Id. 
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The current legislative proposals will not achieve greater 
harmonization with other countries' patent laws, but rather will 
achieve the opposite effect.8 In order to achieve such harmonization, 
Congress would have to transfer the difficult line-drawing 
judgments currently performed under Section 101's eligibility 
doctrine to Section 103's non-obviousness standard, known around 
the world as the "inventive step" requirement. Congress would have 
to do so while: (a) retaining the eligibility exclusions from the 
meaning of "invention" for science, nature, and ideas; and (b) 
preventing the creativity of those ineligible discoveries from 
contributing to the technological character of the claim evaluated 
for non-obviousness.9 None of the pending proposals would do so; 
most seek both to eliminate these historic, world-wide exclusions 
and to avoid having to make those line-drawing non-obviousness 
judgments.10 
 
Expanding the U.S. patent eligibility to include such things 
as business methods and aesthetics, much less scientific, natural, 
and abstract discoveries, would place U.S. law in greater, not lesser, 
tension with the patent law of other jurisdictions.11 This would 
further complicate international prosecution and enforcement 
efforts.12 No such changes are required in order to comply with the 
World Trade Organization's TRIPS Agreement. And increasingly, 
such patents will go to foreign entities, transferring wealth from the 
U.S. to other countries.13 
 
If Congress is to play a constructive role in further clarifying 
the law of eligibility (without addressing problems of the quality of 
 
8 Sarnoff, Joshua D., Testimony of Joshua D. Sarnoff Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary, Subcommittee on Intellectual Property Hearing: The State of Patent 
Eligibility in America: Part I (June 4, 2019). Page 11. Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3572387.  
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
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adjudication more generally), it (a) should provide in legislative 
language, not just in legislative history, and as clearly and 
specifically as possible, the requirements for adjudication and the 
considerations and policies that such adjudication should be based 
on.14 In particular, Congress (b) should explicitly preserve the 
public domain of science, nature, and ideas by requiring in clear 
legislative language that such ineligible discoveries must be treated 
as prior art against the applicant once those discoveries are disclosed 
for public benefit in a patent specification.15 Congress also (c) 
should explicitly abrogate further consideration of or reliance on 
"preemption" concerns, which can be and are better managed by 
Section 112's claim scope doctrines.16 Finally, Congress (d) should 
expressly abrogate prior inconsistent judicial precedents under 
Section 101 that conflict with the new legislative language75 These 
conflicting precedents have continued to induce the PTO to grant 
and the courts to uphold countless patents for uncreative but 
practical applications of ineligible discoveries of science, nature and 
ideas that should not be part of the patent system.17 To simplify 
matters, Congress might simply abrogate all precedents under 
Section 101 and its predecessor provisions, requiring the PTO and 
judges to start from a clean slate when interpreting and applying 







III.  JOSHUA D. SARNOFF ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS 
FOR THE RECORD OF SENATOR RICHARD 
BLUMENTHAL, SUBMITTED TO SENATE JUDICIARY 
 
14 Sarnoff, Joshua D., Testimony of Joshua D. Sarnoff Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary, Subcommittee on Intellectual Property Hearing: The State of Patent 
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COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN, HON. LINDSAY O. GRAHAM 
JUNE 4, 2019 SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY HEARING ON “THE STATE OF PATENT 
ELIGIBILITY IN AMERICA: PART I” JUNE 26, 2019 
 
Q: What impact will broadening the subject matter that can be 
patented have on consumers? 
 
A: As with the effects on industry, the effects on consumers in the 
long run are highly uncertain, given the inability to predict how 
patents affect dynamic innovation and how industries within 
markets will choose to license, compete, and price products and 
services (subject to different government regulatory, antitrust, and 
other policies).  Nevertheless, we know that patents in general 
impose so-called "deadweight" losses on society by increasing costs 
and decreasing access to patented goods relative to the competitive 
alternatives that might be available in markets in the absence of such 
patents.  Thus, we can be reasonably sure that patents will 
adversely affect consumers in the short run, and cannot have any 
confidence that patents will increase consumer welfare in the long 
run. 
 
As I indicated in my written testimony, granting patent rights by 
extending patent eligibility imposes numerous harms in many fields 
of "technology" (or for products or processes that cannot be 
considered technological inventions) to which the patent system 
will be extended.  But knowing that these harms may occur is 
different from accurately predicting their specific nature and 
magnitude.  The opportunity costs of such eligibility extensions are 
likely immense.  But the specific harms and their magnitude also are 
essentially unknowable.  To evaluate such costs would require 
predicting and valuing outcomes that would not otherwise occur and 
thus could be assessed only in a counter-factual universe.  
 
Q: Could the proposed reforms increase consumer prices? If so, 
in what industries or on what products?   
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A: As indicated above, the proposed reforms could and likely will 
increase prices simply by the fact that patents provide rights to 
exclude competition that would otherwise occur and that might 
then lead to decreased prices and increased access to the same or 
similar products.  But predicting whether they would increase 
prices significantly in particular industries, or for which particular 
products, would require speculation for which concrete evidence 
and theory are lacking.   
 
More importantly, the specific amount of price increases for 
particular industries or products will depend on numerous factors, 
including: (1) the scope of claims granted in particular patents; (2) 
the degree to which competitors develop substitute technologies that 
can be produced for the public that do not infringe patent rights, and 
complementary technologies that must be cross-licensed in order to 
produce products for the public; and (3) regulatory and antitrust 
policies.  A vigorous debate currently exists, e.g., as to whether on 
the one hand "fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory" (FRAND) 
licensing policies adopted by standard-setting organizations (SSOs) 
are sufficient to assure that patent rights do not result in excessive 
prices for consumers and that patents can be efficiently cross-
licensed to produce complex consumer products, and on the other 
hand whether such requirements sufficiently protect SSO-
participating patent holders against holdouts by non-participating 
patent holders and against infringers (in the absence of injunctive 
relief).  See generally, e.g., THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF 
TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST, 
AND PATENTS (Jorge L. Contreras ed. 2017).   
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